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INTRODUCTION
Pundits, the media and the general citizenry have a tendency to reach 
for mono-causal explanations of terrorist behaviour and/or motiva-
tion. Typical master narratives posit the strength of single causes like 
mental illness, ideological attractors, and grievances. In recent years, 
‘online radicalisation’ has been added to this list. When evidence 
emerges that an individual engaged in online behaviour associated 
to his/her ideology, the immediate consensus is that the Internet 
caused the action (as opposed to the intended action causing the 
individual to have recourse to the Internet). The truth however is 
“typically more complicated. Neither [online] radicalisation nor griev-
ances alone are typically sufficient to cause an individual to engage 
in terrorism” (Borum, 2013:105). The question remains whether this 
complexity is actually illustrated within the academic literature or 
not. Is it a case of academics also offering simplistic mono-causal 
explanations, or is it a case of rigorous scientific evidence failing 
to be communicated to the masses?
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EXISTING LITERATURE
A quick search of the relevant academic literature on online radical-
isation on Google Scholar largely supports the former. We examined 
the first 200 abstracts based on a search of “online radicalisation OR 
online radicalization”. In particular we were interested in (a) whether/
if any data informed the analysis and (b) whether there were contin-
uing ‘truisms’ within the literature regarding the process of online 
radicalisation or the means to counter it which remained empirically 
unverified. Below we document a number of recurring problems. 
One of the key problems is an abundance of conceptual problems. 
A wide-range of virtual behaviours is subsumed into the category of 
online radicalisation. A simple search of news articles from March 
2015 shows that a range of behaviours from accessing information 
on overseas events via the Internet, to accessing extremist content 
and propaganda, to detailing attack plans in a blog post, have all been 
considered as online radicalisation. Academic efforts have tried to 
categorise these different forms of behaviour. Neumann (2013), for 
example, delineates instrumental uses (e.g. logistics and reconnais-
sance, fund raising, provision of training manuals and videos, using 
the Internet as a weapon) from communicative uses (e.g. publicising 
the cause, generating political support and recruitment). However, 
there has been no study to date that attempts to to quantify the 
regularity of these behaviours. Instead the field occasionally relies 
upon single in-depth case studies or simple anecdotal illustrations 
(see Appendix 1). 
The other key problem is that of data. Even for a field as bereft 
of empiricism as terrorism studies, the striking lack of data is 
surprising. Of the 200 abstracts analysed, only 6.5% utilised any 
form of data. Primary data was utilised in just 2% of the studies, 
but this mostly focused on extremist forums and social media 
and, therefore, largely captured radicalised individuals (and not 
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necessarily individuals prepared to conduct terrorism). There 
was also a distinct lack of psychological (1%) or criminological 
(0%) inquiry into online radicalisation in this sample. This is 
striking because psychological paradigms may help explain 
the process through which people become engaged/radicalised 
in a virtual space and how it differs from a real-world space. 
Instead, the literature assumes virtual space is a good substitute 
for physical interactions, but fails to tell us why and in what 
contexts in particular. 
The lack of criminological inquiry is also striking since it has fairly 
well developed paradigms for the study of online crimes and how they 
are committed (e.g. cyber enabled vs. cyber dependent) (McGuire and 
Dowling, 2013a; McGuire and Dowling, 2013b). There is also a 
tendency to treat all terrorists in an aggregated way, expecting that 
what applies to one type (e.g. an al-Qaeda inspired individual) may 
also apply to a second type (e.g. a right-wing inspired individual) 
despite the grievances, ideological underpinnings and radicalising 
settings looking very different. Finally, the 200 abstracts regularly 
made unempirical (and sometimes unverifiable) claims. For example, 
Sageman (2008) outlines that “during the past two or three years…
face-to-face radicalisation has been replaced by online radicalisation”. 
Omotoyinbo (2009) similarly outlines that “it has been initially 
identified that radicalisation is basically having two versions which 
are online and offline”. Neumann (2013) comments on countering 
online radicalisation, and argues that “approaches aimed at restricting 
freedom of speech and removing content from the Internet are not 
only the least desirable, they are also the least effective”. It is assump-
tions like these that we put to the test in this report. 
Typically, the truth behind these assumptions is far more 
complex. However, in the absence of data, we cannot begin to try 
and unpack this complexity in a scientifically rigorous way. Here 
we seek to unpack the degrees to which the Internet is used across 
a large sample of terrorist offenders; whether some attributes of the 
offender make it more likely he/she will make use of the Internet; 
measure the degrees to which different behaviours are occurring 
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online; and outline which of these behaviours are on the increase 
and whether they can be linked to an uptake in terrorism offenders 
in general, thus providing one of the first empirical treatments of 
online radicalisation.
Perhaps the stand-out empirical study of online radicalisation 
is that of von Behr et al. (2013). They examined primary data of 15 
radicalised individuals, nine of whom were convicted under UK  
terrorism legislation. The study made use of interviews (with police 
and the individuals themselves), trial records and computer regis-
tries.1 They came to the following empirically-informed conclusions:
1. The Internet affords more prospects for radicalisation. For all 
15 cases, the Internet was a “key source of information, communi-
cation and of propaganda for their extremist beliefs”.
2. The Internet provides a “greater opportunity than offline interac-
tions to confirm existing beliefs”.
3. The Internet does not necessarily accelerate the process 
of radicalisation. 
4. The Internet is “not a substitute for in-person meetings but, 
rather, complements in-person communication”.
5. The Internet does not necessarily increase the opportunities 
for self-radicalisation; interactions, be they physical or virtual, 
are still crucial for radicalisation.2 
In terms of measuring the degree to which a large sample of terrorists 
engaged in online activities, Gill et al.’s (2014) study was perhaps the 
first. In a sample of 119 lone actor terrorists, they found that 35% 
of the sample virtually interacted with a wider network of political 
activists and that 46% learned aspects of their attack method through 
virtual sources. They also found that al-Qaeda inspired lone actors 
(65%) were significantly more likely to learn through virtual sources 
1 Computer registries essentially log all activities conducted on a computer. 
2 See the full report at www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_
reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf 
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than their right-wing inspired (37%) or single-issue inspired (19%) 
counterparts. They also found that isolated dyads were significantly 
more likely to interact with co-ideologues online than those who 
committed their attacks alone. These latter results emerged from 
two inferential comparative analyses across ideologies and actor type. 
Using a range of inferential statistical techniques, Gill and Corner 
(2015) took this disaggregated comparative approach further and  
specifically compared the behaviours and traits of a sample of 
lone-actor terrorists who either (a) learned online or (b) interacted 
with co-ideologues online, with a sample of lone-actor terrorists 
who did neither. Their study came to seven main conclusions:
1. The growth of the Internet did not correlate with a rise in  
lone-actor terrorist activity year-on-year from 1990 to 2011.
2. There is a growing trend amongst lone-actors to make use of 
the Internet. In other words, whilst the Internet has not caused 
a growth in numbers of lone actor terrorists, it has altered 
their means of radicalisation and attack learning. The Internet, 
therefore, acts as a substitute for other factors such as intelligence 
gathering and attack planning, not necessarily a force enabler.
3. Younger offenders were significantly more likely to engage in 
both virtual learning and virtual interaction than older offenders. 
4. The non-US based offenders were significantly more likely 
to learn through virtual sources. 
5. Offenders who interacted virtually with co-ideologues were 
significantly less likely to successfully carry out a violent attack. 
6. Offenders who made use of online tools to prepare for an attack 
were significantly less likely to kill or injure (despite being 
significantly more likely to plot an attack against indiscriminate 
soft targets).
7. There was a significant positive correlation between those who 
virtually interacted with co-ideologues and who interacted with 
co-ideologues face-to-face. Radicalisation (at least for lone actors) 
WHAT ARE THE ROLES OF THE INTERNET IN TERRORISM?9
is not a dichotomy of either offline or online, but rather a dichot-
omy of interaction with others versus no interaction with others. 
The Gill and Corner (2015) and von Behr et al. (2013) studies stand 
apart from rest of the literature for their empirical focus on terrorist 
offenders. Despite the disparity in their sample size, data and method, 
they are largely in agreement about the role of the Internet in radical-
isation particularly in three key facets. First, the Internet has not led 
to a rise in terrorism. Second, off-line interactions often go hand-in-
hand with those online. Third, the Internet facilitates radicalisation, 
but does not accelerate it. 
Gill and Corner (2015) also outlined a series of illustrative 
examples that highlighted the different forms of online learning 
undertaken and interaction engaged in by lone actors. Forms of 
virtual interactions included (a) reinforcing of prior beliefs; (b) seeking 
legitimisation for future actions; (c) disseminating propaganda and 
providing material support for others; (d) attack signalling; and 
(e) attempting to recruit others. Forms of virtual learning included 
(a) accessing ideological content; (b) opting for violence; (c) choosing 
a target; (d) preparing an attack; and (e) overcoming hurdles. 
This study builds upon the Rand and Gill and Corner studies 
by quantifying the degree to which these behaviours occurred and 
by outlining the behavioural correlates of such activity. It seeks to 
further improve our empirical understanding of online radicalisation. 
It is focused upon finding out (a) whether those who interact virtually 
with like-minded activists, or learn online, display markedly different 
experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) 
than those who do not; (b) whether the online space is an enabler 
for radicalisation or a substitute for previous locations in which 
radicalisation occurred; and (c) how the Internet has helped individu-
als overcome some of the hurdles involved in undertaking a terrorist 
attack. In some ways, this study is seeking to explain whether the 
previous findings by Gill and Corner (2015) regarding online activities 
are generalisable to the terrorist sample as a whole, or whether they 
are specific to lone-actors. But it also forges ahead in new domains 
of interest.
THE VIOLENT 
ONLINE 
POLITICAL 
EXTREMISM 
DATABASE
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anyone familiar with the terrorism studies field will not be 
surprised by the lack of data-driven analyses noted above. Reviews 
of the literature have long since noted the paucity in data (Schmid 
and Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2004). Improvements are occurring, 
but tend to focus upon terrorist events as opposed to the terrorists 
who conduct them (Silke, 2013). The growth in empirical examina-
tions of terrorist events is largely due to the provision of the Global 
Terrorism Database by the START consortium3 and to the fact that 
terrorist events are much easier to observe, operationalise and code 
compared to the myriad factors that may be of interest in the coding 
of an individual and his/her motivation. This is not to say that the 
coding of individual terrorists is an impossible task, it is just compar-
atively more time-consuming and complex. The past decade has seen 
a small number of studies that utilised this approach provide remark-
able insight into the cadres of Irish Republican groups (Horgan and 
Morrison, 2011; Gill and Horgan, 2013), ETA (Reinares, 2004), right-
wing groups (Gruenewald et al., 2013) and al-Qaeda (Sageman, 2004), 
as well as lone-actor terrorists (Gill et al., 2014, Gill, 2015). 
The data utilised in this report builds upon these types of data 
collection processes and analyses. Our remit was to create a compre-
hensive database of individuals reportedly radicalised via the Internet 
and conduct a series of quantitative and qualitative analyses of this 
data. In order to maximise the potential utility of this endeavour 
and its scientific rigour, a number of potential hurdles needed to 
be surmounted. First (and arguably most significantly), much of 
the terrorism studies literature suffers from a simple methodological 
problem: empirical studies on terrorism regularly sample on the 
dependent variable. Put simply, this process involves selecting cases 
only on the basis of a certain criteria being met, and only making 
using of these cases as evidence for the criteria. For example, Pape’s 
(2005) study of suicide terrorism selects states that experienced 
suicide terrorism and then analyses what they shared in common 
3 See www.start.umd.edu for full details of the START consortium and  
www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?region= for the Global 
Terrorism Database.
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(i.e. democratic structures, foreign occupation, etc.). He neglects 
to look at states that also share these characteristics but did not 
experience suicide terrorism. This has profound implications for 
the strength and generalisability of his findings (see Ashworth et al., 
2008 for a full examination of Pape’s sampling problems). If the pres-
ent study were to simply consider only individuals reported to have 
been radicalised via the Internet, we would be unable to look at the 
correlates of terrorists’ decisions to use the Internet as the data would 
not include those cases that neglected to use the Internet. In other 
words, we would be unable to falsify the claims we make or test 
hypotheses based on the arguments of the wider literature.  
The decision was therefore made to build a database of terrorist 
actors and code for a number of Internet-related activities whether 
they were present or not. This meant we could capture a continuum 
of Internet-inspired actors from the fully uninspired to the fully 
inspired, and plot many positions along the way.
This decision had implications for how far we should spread 
our scope geographically and ideologically. Deciding to widen our 
net in terms of including the non-virtually radicalised necessitated 
tightening the net in other areas to allow for the sort of empirically 
rich data-crawl needed. The decisions taken here were a mixture of 
practical and conceptual ones. In order to build a dataset of terrorist 
actors, the first step is to build an actor dictionary (simply, a list of 
individuals to be coded). We needed our actor dictionary to be suffi-
ciently large to allow for inferential statistical methods to be applied. 
However, it was decided that the actor dictionary must be limited to 
a single country in order to minimise the bias that might arise in the 
open-source reporting and availability of data cross-nationally. In 
other words, (online) radicalisation might be reported in very different 
ways in different countries such that the differences identified may 
just be the vagaries of culturally distinct reporting methods. To mini-
mise bias, a single country with sufficient terrorism cases was deemed 
the most appropriate approach. Access to open sources is, of course, 
also key to the building of such a database; thus the availability of 
English language texts were also deemed crucial. This left us with two 
countries, the United Kingdom and the United States. We chose the 
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United Kingdom for a number of reasons: (a) prior research by Gill 
and Corner (2015) that showed higher levels of online behaviours in 
the UK sample vs. the US sample of lone actor terrorists; (b) availabil-
ity of terrorism actor dictionaries; (c) spread of ideologically inspired 
actors; (d) location of the researchers; and (e) source of research 
funding. It was later decided to omit Irish Republican actors from the 
data collection activities as their online activities were rarely, if ever, 
mentioned in open source reporting. Their inclusion would, there-
fore, make the data analyses biased to an unacceptable extent as each 
field would be entered as a ‘No’, thus dramatically undercounting the 
likely representation of online behaviours by Irish Republicans. 
The list of actors to be coded was identified through a number 
of sources. The most significant was the Simcox et al. (2011) study 
that lists all al-Qaeda inspired individuals convicted in the United 
Kingdom. For the purposes of this study, the list was updated through 
to the end of 2014. Further (largely extreme right-wing) names were 
also sourced through tailored search strings developed and applied to 
the LexisNexis “All English News” option. More individuals were also 
identified through START’s Global Terrorism Database. Lone-actors 
were identified through previous studies (Gill et al., 2014). It was 
then decided to limit the population to post-1990 events because 
a large portion of our data was sourced from the LexisNexis4 archive, 
which remains relatively limited pre-1990. Finally, we limited our 
scope to those who were either convicted in the UK or died in the 
commissioning of a terrorist act in the UK; British fighters in Syria and 
elsewhere were therefore omitted.
In total 227 offenders fit the specified geographical, temporal 
and operational criteria. Once the actor dictionary was compiled, 
the codebook was developed. 136 separate data points were coded 
for each actor. The variables included in the codebook span 
socio-demographic information (e.g. age, gender, occupation, 
family characteristics, relationship status, occupation, employment); 
network behaviours (e.g. number of co-offenders, training location); 
4 LexisNexis currently provides an electronic online archive from more than 
20,000 global news sources.
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event-specific behaviours (e.g. attack method(s), target(s)); and 
post-event behaviours and experiences (e.g. claim(s) of responsibility, 
arrest/conviction details). Data were collected on demographic and 
background characteristics and radicalisation-linked behaviours 
by examining and coding information contained in open-source 
news reports, sworn affidavits and, when possible, publically avail-
able first-hand accounts. The vast majority of data was culled from 
press reports via tailored LexisNexis searches. Additional information 
was gleaned from online public record depositories (e.g. document-
cloud.org), terrorist biographies and relevant scholarly articles.
We also coded for attributes and behaviours commonly associated 
with online radicalisation. These questions were developed in two 
stages. The first stage developed from previous research conducted 
by the researchers on lone-actor terrorists (Gill et al., 2014; Gill and 
Corner, 2015). The Gill et al. (2014) study simply asked two questions 
related to online behaviour: Did the individual learn from virtual 
sources? Did the individual interact with co-ideologues online? 
The Gill and Corner (2015) study unpicked these two questions 
further and outlined a series of illustrative examples to show that 
the types of learning and interaction differed from case to case. 
These more disaggregated behaviours were coded for in this study. 
The second stage involved an iterative coding process with new 
questions developed as the data was collected and reviewed. 
Two coders were tasked with coding the data on each terrorist 
offender. In cases where coders could not agree on the correct 
assignment of particular variables, differences were resolved based 
on an examination of the original sources that the coders relied upon 
to make their assessments. Such decisions factored in the compara-
tive reliability and quality of the sources (e.g. reports that cover trial 
proceedings versus reports issued in the immediate aftermath of an 
event) and the sources cited in the report. 
It is important to emphasise some limitations inherent in the 
sources used in this study. First, the sample only includes information 
on individuals who planned or conducted attacks reported in the 
media. It is possible incidents could be missed altogether because 
they either (a) led to convictions, but did not register any national 
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media interest but may have been reported in local news sources 
not covered in the LexisNexis archives or (b) were intercepted or  
disrupted by security forces without a conviction being made. 
Second, as the level of detail reported varied significantly across 
incidents, data collection was limited to what could reasonably 
be collected for each terrorist offender. Third, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between missing data and variables that should be coded 
as a ‘no’. Given the nature of newspaper and open-source reporting, 
it is unrealistic to expect each biographically oriented story to contain 
lengthy passages that list each variable or behaviour the offender did 
not engage in (e.g. the offender was not a substance abuser, a former 
convict, recently exposed to new media). For the statistical analyses 
that follow, where possible, we do report or distinguish between 
missing data and ‘no’ answers, but it should be kept in mind that 
the likely result is that ‘no’ answers are substantially undercounted 
in the analysis. Each variable in the analysis is treated dichotomously 
(e.g. the response is either a ‘yes’, or not enough information to 
suggest a ‘yes’). There is precedent for this in previous research 
on attempted assassinations of public figures, fatal school shootings, 
and targeted violence affecting higher education institutions (Fein 
and Vossekuil, 1999; Vossekuil et al., 2002) as well as the terrorism 
offender datasets outlined at the outset of this sub-section. Unless 
otherwise stated, each of the figures reported below are of the whole 
sample (n=227). Finally, the fact that ‘online radicalisation’ is seen as 
a moral hazard means that the level of available granular behavioural 
data is far higher than for some other types of issues that could be 
equally important (such as family upbringing or other factors associ-
ated with exposure to extremist narratives). However, this granularity 
does not go so far as to consistently outline the website(s) relied upon, 
exact information gathered online, or frequency of Internet activity, 
for example.
Despite these limitations, open source accounts can provide rich 
data. This has been demonstrated in other studies focusing upon 
the socio-demographic characteristics, operational behaviours and 
developmental pathways of members of formal terrorist organisations 
and lone-actor terrorists (Gill and Horgan, 2014; Gill et al., 2014). 
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Reporting (and hence data availability) also tends to be richer 
when terrorism incidents are relatively rare and can therefore add 
great insight into terrorist offenders in the UK considering it remains 
a relatively low base-rate phenomenon.
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RESULTS
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BASIC DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
The offenders captured in this database were largely male (96%). 
They ranged in age from 16 to 58 with a median age of 27, a mode 
of 22 and a mean of 28. One third were unemployed, a further one 
third worked in the service or administrative workforce and 14% 
were students. 22% had some form of university education. One half 
of the convictions related to a planned attack whilst the other half 
related to facilitative behaviours (e.g. financing, distributing propa-
ganda). Only 14% of the convictions related to a completed attack. 
The results suggest that key signals of intent to act, such as 
seeking legitimisation from epistemic authority figures (legitimisa-
tion) and announcing the intent to act (AttackSignal), rarely co-occur 
(e.g. they are on opposite ends of the two-dimensional space). 
As demonstrated within the matrix, commonly occurring behaviours 
such as passive consumption of websites (Websites) and extremists 
texts (Texts) are in the middle. To the bottom-right of this cluster 
are behaviours directly related to attacks and include behaviours 
related to attack preparation, target choice, overcoming difficulties 
in preparing the attack (Hurdles) and signalling intent (AttackSignal). 
On the direct-opposite side to these clusters (i.e. the top left) lie 
behaviours related to terrorist facilitation (rather than action) and 
include behaviours like disseminating propaganda (Dissemination), 
provision of material support and actively engaging with other  
co-ideologues in chatrooms and forums. These two clusters may 
distinguish violent online radicals from the wider population of  
non-violent online radicals. 
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Figure 1: Number of terrorism offenders per year
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Turning to actors’ virtual activities, in 61% of cases there was 
evidence of online activity related to their ultimate attack or 
conviction. The results indicate there is a substitution effect at 
play to some degree: greater Internet usage within the UK does 
not correspond with a surge in terrorist activity (see Figure 1), 
instead the number of arrests (black line) closely correspond to 
the onset of new and greater legislative powers in the UK What 
we can identify is the Internet shaping some of the pre-attack 
behaviours like online communication (lighter grey line), which 
is particularly the case from 2012 onwards with regards to online 
learning (darker grey line). 
As mentioned previously, we then disaggregated the content of this 
activity and these behaviours are rank ordered by popularity below.
Just over half (54%) of all actors used the Internet to learn about 
some aspect of their intended terrorist activity. From 2012 onwards, 
the figure is 76%.
Extremist media was found or downloaded and subsequently 
reported upon in the open-source domain for 44% of actors. In 
half of these cases (21%), the content was reported to be videos 
with smaller figures reported for lectures (7%) and photographs 
(6%). The content itself ranges broadly and includes videos of 9/11 
and attacks on coalition forces; beheadings and executions; crimes 
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against Muslims in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq; 
news footage of bombings; interviews with and 
speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki, Osama bin Laden, 
Abu Hamza and other radical preachers; pro-jihad 
rallies; bomb-making instruction videos and 
terrorist training videos. 
A third (32%) prepared for their attacks using 
online resources. These included bomb-making 
instruction videos; poison manuals; Inspire 
magazine; surveillance advice; an assassination guidebook; torture 
techniques; suicide vest production; body disposal; plans for the 
London Underground, Buckingham Palace and other prestigious 
landmarks; MP voting records and terrorist training method manuals.
At least 30% accessed extremist ideological content online. 
In many cases, there was arguably too much material for any one 
individual to consume and understand thoroughly. One actor had 
17,779 computer files of ideological material, 1,152 of which contained 
extremist content. This may be typical for those individuals that 
download materials in large volumes via BitTorrent.5 
Just under a third (29%) of actors communicated with others 
virtually, half of whom did so via email (15%). Smaller figures were 
said to communicate with others via online discussion forums (8%) 
and chat rooms (9%). Some of these interactions circled around the 
legitimacy of targets. In one case, the interactions involved discussion 
of the comparative legitimacy of targeting civilians as opposed to 
civil servants or the police. In other cases, the interactions involved 
discussion of the intricacies of carrying out an attack. For example, 
one case involved a detailed discussion around the making of 
Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine (HMTD)6 and how to develop 
the correct concentration of hydrogen peroxide. 
Fifteen per cent of actors disseminated propaganda online. 
Some of these individuals set up specific websites for this purpose. 
5 A protocol that allows for transferring large amounts of data via peer-to-
peer file sharing. 
6 A highly explosive organic compound.
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For example, the administrators of the Aryan Strike Force website 
are included in the actor dataset. Others attempted to publish man-
uals concerning firearms and explosives on the Internet in order to 
incite others. 
Evidence suggests that 14% of the offenders opted to engage 
in violence after witnessing something online. In one case, an 
individual read a letter on an extremist website about an Iraqi woman 
who said she had been repeatedly raped by her captors at Baghdad’s 
Abu Ghraib; prison, he relayed that this made him firm-up his plans 
to take “positive action” in response. 
One in ten of the sample used online resources to help overcome 
a hurdle they faced in the physical planning of an attack.
A small minority of individuals (9%) sought to recruit 
others online. 
Whilst we outline above that a third of the sample prepared for 
some aspect of their attacks online, 9% specifically chose their target 
after online research. The analysis undertaken by police on one 
Islamist-inspired plot showed the plotters had used the Internet to 
research the English Defence League, their activists, and the locations 
of its leader for up to a month prior to the day they plotted to bomb 
an EDL rally. 
Some (6%) provided material support to others online, for 
example by asking others to donate money to their cause or by selling 
The Anarchist Cookbook online. 
A very few (5%) sought legitimisation for future actions from epis-
temic authority figures online; others did this indirectly by searching 
for fatwas and other legitimating texts. One individual conducted 
the following Google searches: “three places were [sic] you can kill 
someone in Islam”, “three place [sic] were [sic] you can kill someone 
in Islam in punishment”. 
Five per cent also signalled online their plans to engage in attacks 
prior to the attack itself. 
As mentioned in the data section, the degree to which actors 
utilised Internet sources was difficult to determine due to data una-
vailability. In the vast majority of cases it was only possible to identify 
whether the Internet was used or not. Isolated cases do provide some 
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insight, but this is variable and not generalisable. One actor only 
began researching bomb-making techniques weeks before engaging 
in his attack whilst others reportedly spent months on Internet 
research, with one actor spending a reported six hours a day watching 
extremist footage and videos.
In most plots we see a great deal of the above outlined activities 
occurring. In the following sections, we outline these overlaps both 
qualitatively (through a brief overview of major terrorist plots) 
and quantitatively (through the use of a multi-dimensional scaling 
technique called Smallest Space Analysis).
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: BEHAVIOUR CLUSTERING
The purpose of this section is to outline a number of brief illustrative 
examples of serious terrorist plots/attacks in the UK The intention 
of these illustrations is to (a) provide greater context to the descriptive 
statistical results outlined above; (b) illustrate the strategic and/or tac-
tical utility of turning to the Internet; (c) highlight that despite each 
case being alluded to as examples of ‘online radicalisation’, the actual 
co-occurring behaviours differ widely from case to case; and  
(d) provide the basis from which a quantitative analysis of behavioural 
clustering can be conducted.
The first illustration is that of David Copeland. His nail bombing 
campaign occurred between 17 and 30 April, 1999. In total, three 
bombs targeted minority communities across London. The bombings 
occurred over three successive weekends, killed three (including a 
pregnant woman), and injured a further 129. Two years previously, 
Copeland had tried to carry out an attack using a bomb ‘recipe’ from 
The Terrorist’s Handbook, a manual that he downloaded from the 
Internet in April 1997. He purchased ammonium nitrate and the 
required detonators; he also managed to steal a large canister of nitric 
acid. However, the manual failed to provide an exhaustive list of all of 
the necessary explosive compounds, and Copeland found it “too com-
plex” to manufacture and procure the missing chemical compounds 
by himself. Frustrated, Copeland temporarily gave up. In June 1998 
he downloaded a second manual, How to Make Bombs Part 2. At first 
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he tried to build a fertiliser bomb; he purchased liquid ammonium 
from a local medical supply shop and ordered rocket fuses, but again 
he failed to manufacture a fully functioning device. Copeland then 
sought to build smaller devices and again used the second manual 
to learn how to make a pipe bomb. Twelve years later, Anders Breivik 
faced similar problems while attempting to manufacture a series of 
car bombs. Breivik initially planned to build four IEDs. He began work 
on 3 May. On 5 May, Breivik ground aspirin tablets with a mortar and 
pestle and later with a dumbbell. On 6 May, Breivik began synthesis-
ing acetylsalicylic acid from the powdered aspirin. This proved prob-
lematic because the instructions he followed in the bomb-making 
manual he downloaded did not work. According to Breivik himself, 
he “began to somewhat panic…and began to lose heart” (Breivik, 2011: 
1455). This delayed him for three days until a YouTube video provided 
a viable alternative solution that he tested successfully on 9 May 2011. 
Rather than downscaling the nature and complexity of his IED as 
Copeland did, Breivik had recourse to YouTube and a solution to his 
problem. The Copeland example offers two key insights with regard 
to the role of the Internet. First, his political socialisation occurred 
face-to-face within the British National Party but his attack planning 
was facilitated by his online activities. The two main aspects of radi-
calisation, ideological affinity and violent preparation were therefore 
compartmentalised into physical and virtual domains. Second, 
Copeland’s difficulties were overcome by Breivik quite easily twelve 
years later, highlighting the ever-changing nature of aspects of virtual 
learning as new technologies develop and increase the capacity of 
malevolently intentioned actors. 
In March 2004, Operation Crevice disrupted the Fertiliser 
Bomb Plot. This plot involved several conspirators buying 600kg 
of ammonium nitrate with the intent of developing a large IED that 
would target either a shopping market or the National Grid. The 
disruption was seen as the British Intelligence Services’ first major 
success against a domestic al-Qaeda inspired terrorist plot. The 
five convicted plotters used Internet chat rooms on pornographic 
websites to communicate with each other about the plot and also 
emailed associates discussing how to manufacture detonators. The 
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plotters also downloaded fertiliser bomb instruction manuals and 
purchased clothing and camping equipment online for training camps 
in Pakistan. Much of this activity occurred in an Internet café. Again, 
the openly available information about this case points to the fact that 
the Internet helped build capacity for the attack and not necessarily 
the willingness to conduct the attack in the first place. In other words, 
the Internet fostered internal cohesion, security, networks (both 
facilitative and action-oriented) and instruction. All of these activities 
are possible in the physical world, but the Internet perhaps provided 
greater security and easier access to these materials and people. 
The 7 July 2005 London transit suicide bombers wanted to make 
use of the Internet to spread their message. They created a farewell 
video regarding the impending attack and wanted to produce a 
website to disseminate propaganda and other radicalising materials. 
They too downloaded information about explosives and how to 
manufacture bombs, watched videos of radical preachers and of 
violent crimes against Muslims in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The failed suicide bomb attacks that followed two weeks later had far 
fewer press reports about their online activity, which is at odds with 
the reporting of other plots and attacks in which court testimony 
was heavily reported upon. The case was made in court, however, that 
the 21 July plotters watched bomb-making videos online, downloaded 
Bin Laden’s speeches, and read online about crimes committed 
against Muslims in Iraq. These two cases differ from Copeland and 
Operation Crevice because there is clear evidence of the Internet’s 
role across the arc of the terrorist plot – from attaining an ideological 
cause, deciding to act, and planning the attack to post-attack prop-
aganda dissemination – these cases demonstrate that the Internet 
enabled every aspect of the plot but was not the sole contributor. 
In August 2006, British intelligence disrupted a plot to detonate 
liquid explosives upon seven transatlantic flights. There is very little 
to distinguish this plot from the two in July 2005 in terms of their 
online behaviours. The plotters sent coded shared online messages 
and made efforts to make a documentary to be posted on YouTube 
about injustices against Muslims in the Middle East alongside their 
last will and testament videos. They utilised an Internet café to 
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research flight timetables on the BAA Heathrow website, researched 
how to make explosive devices using soft drink bottles, found 
bomb-making recipes online and researched potential suppliers 
of hydrogen peroxide. 
In June 2007, two individuals conducted coordinated car bomb 
attacks in London and a follow-up attack at Glasgow International 
Airport in which they drove their Jeep Cherokee loaded with pro-
pane canisters into the terminal doors. The perpetrators utilised 
jihadi forums and chat rooms and other more popular websites like 
YouTube that hosted extremist material. Using Internet message 
services, they logged hours of communications and later saved emails 
chronicling their plans to commit an attack in their drafts folders 
for family members to access them. They also utilised Skype to talk 
about bomb-making amongst themselves. On other websites, they 
researched bomb-making techniques, including how to set off a bomb 
with a mobile phone and later bought some components online. 
They also regularly posted on blogs and websites that promoted vio-
lence against the West, and downloaded speeches by Bin Laden along-
side 15,000 files of ideologically inflammatory materials. The pattern 
set in motion during the July 2005 plots at this stage appears to 
become the norm, the Internet playing a facilitative or enabling role 
at many parts of the attack preparation and conduct stages. Each 
of these behaviours can occur offline, however, so again these are 
depicted as cyber-enabled behaviours rather than cyber-dependent. 
On 14 May, 2010, student Roshonara Choudhry stabbed Stephen 
Timms, a Labour Party Member of Parliament, causing him seri-
ous bodily injury. Investigators established that Choudhry began 
downloading Anwar al-Awlaki’s videos and sermons in the autumn 
and winter of 2009. She began spending an abundance of time in 
her bedroom; her parents believed she was studying, but in reality 
she was downloading extremist material, including more than 
100 hours of al-Awlaki’s sermons. It was supposedly during this time 
that Choudhry decided to engage in a violent attack. During her 
police interview, Choudhry responded to a question concerning the 
transition from immersing herself in religion to committing violence 
by stating: “Because as Muslims we’re all brothers and sisters and 
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we should all look out for each other and we shouldn’t sit back and 
do nothing while others suffer. We shouldn’t allow the people who 
oppress us to get away with it and to think that they can do whatever 
they want to us and we’re just gonna’ [sic] lie down and take it”. 
Choudhry referred to a specific YouTube video of Sheikh Abdullah 
Azzam that made her understand “even women are supposed to fight” 
and that she had an obligation to turn toward violence. According 
to the police interviews, Choudhry had this realisation at some point 
in April and soon after began her preparations for the attack. 
As part of her preparations, Choudhry devised a list of Members 
of Parliament who voted for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. She researched 
the backgrounds of London-based Members of Parliament using the 
website ‘They Work For You’, which includes information on voting 
records. She appears to have concentrated her research on Labour 
ministers Jim Fitzpatrick, Margaret Hodge, Nick Raynsford and 
Stephen Timms. Detectives later declared that Timms was her “sole 
and easiest target”. The decision to attack Timms, Choudhry’s local 
Member of Parliament, was made three to four weeks prior to the 
attack itself. Her online research showed that Timms regularly voted 
with his political party, which held power at that time. Choudhry 
later told detectives that, “he just voted strongly for everything, as 
though he had no mercy. As though he felt no doubts that what he 
was doing was right even though it was such an arrogant thing to do 
and I just felt like if he could treat the Iraqi people so mercilessly, then 
why should I show him any mercy?” The Choudhry case appears to 
buck the trend of the previous illustrations and may be a result of her 
(a) being a lone actor (in a far greater Internet-dependent world than 
Copeland operated within 10 years prior); (b) adopting an extremist 
ideology in the absence of co-ideologues in the physical world, most 
likely because of her gender; and (c) choosing a primitive attack 
type. Whereas the balance in the other cases tipped towards attack 
facilitation, this is the first illustration where ideological attainment 
appears to be far more dependent upon virtual behaviours. 
In June 2013, Ian Forman’s plot to firebomb a number of mosques 
in the Liverpool area was disrupted. Forman had previously com-
municated his desire to “blow them up” in a series of YouTube posts. 
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He had also conducted some online surveillance of his targets, 
downloading pictures of Mosques in his home town and, following 
months of Internet research, drawing-up a shopping list of bomb 
components. Where the Forman plot differs from the other two lone 
actor cases is that (a) he chose a far more complex attack type than 
Choudhry’s, necessitating greater online learning, and (b) the greater 
powers of the Internet allowed for more sophisticated surveillance 
techniques to be used in the attack planning compared to Copeland 
in 1999 whose attack planning was riddled with basic errors 
(see Gill, 2015 for a full analysis of Copeland’s decision-making).
These cases are very different in terms of ideological under-
pinnings, attack types chosen, and network structure (ranging 
from lone actors to big cells). However, they share a number of 
commonalities. The use of the Internet was largely for instrumen-
tal purposes whether it be pre-attack (e.g. surveillance, learning, 
practice, communication) or post-attack (e.g. disseminating 
propaganda). In criminological terms, these activities were 
cyber-enabled rather than cyber-dependent. There is little-to-no 
evidence to suggest the Internet was the sole explanation that got 
actors to the point of deciding to engage in a violent act. Instead, 
it was just one factor amongst many that helped crystallise 
motivation, intent and capability at the same time and place. 
Evidence further suggests that many went online not to have 
their beliefs changed but rather reinforced. In the aftermath 
of Ian Davison’s trial (in which his son was also convicted on 
other offences) for developing ricin, police sources noted that 
Davison’s “views developed over time. After going online he 
accessed websites and started to look at places where those kinds 
of views were shared with other people”. This further confirms 
the “echo chamber” hypothesis put forward in the von Behr et al. 
(2013) study mentioned earlier. The above cases are just illustra-
tions, however. In the next section, we seek to quantitatively test 
whether certain behaviours are more closely correlated within 
our wider sample of plotters.
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: BEHAVIOUR CLUSTERING
The above illustrations are problematic in terms of generalisable 
validity and reliability, so the decision was taken to look at quanti-
tative correlations between the various online behaviours that we 
described in the results for above. Pearson correlations show a high 
degree of positive correlation across the various online behaviours. 
However, these results are entirely dyadic and there may be interven-
ing variables causing these associations. Such concerns may therefore 
warrant the use of multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) techniques, 
which uncover distinctive clusters of variables by providing geometric 
representations of the level of association between variables. In other 
words, MDS outputs represent a matrix wherein variables that reg-
ularly co-occur are plotted closer together in a Euclidean space. The 
utility of such a representation is that the variable configuration is 
based upon variables’ relationships with each other rather than their 
relationships with pre-determined dimensions (Davis, 2009:508). 
One form of MDS, Smallest Space Analysis (SSA), has been 
used to examine a wide spectrum of offences including sexual 
assault (Alison and Stein, 2001; House, 1997; Canter et al., 1998), 
homicide (Godwin, 2000; Salfati and Canter, 1999), arson 
(Canter and Fritzon, 1998), stalking, (Canter and Ioannou, 2004) 
and terrorism events involving hostage taking (Fritzon et al., 2001). 
SSA is “based upon the assumption that the underlying structure 
of complex systems is most readily appreciated if the relationship 
between each and every other variable is examined, but that such 
examination is much clearer if the relationships are represented 
visually not only in terms of numbers” (Canter et al., 2004:308).
The analysis below depicts an SSA output based on the online 
behaviours quantified earlier. The Jaccard co-efficient, which repre-
sents the level of association between two variables, was calculated 
for each pair-wise set of variables. The closer two variables appear 
within the matrix, the higher their co-occurrence across observations.
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Figure 2: Smallest space analysis of 17 online behaviors
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The results suggest that key signals of intent to act, such as 
seeking legitimisation from epistemic authority figures (legitimi-
sation) and announcing the intent to act (AttackSignal), rarely 
co-occur (i.e. they are on opposite ends of the two-dimensional 
space). A cluster of behaviours on the right-side indicates that 
in many cases offenders both opted (Opting) to engage in violence 
and prepared for their attacks (Preparation) in virtual spaces 
and that much of this was aided by online ideological content 
(Ideological), such as videos, lectures and texts. On the other 
hand, the left-hand cluster indicates a different set of behaviours 
linked to the passive consumption of static websites that are 
more  closely aligned with the provision of material support 
and target choices. 
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INFERENTIAL FINDINGS
In order to compare those actors who engaged in online activities 
with those who did not, we followed the procedures in Gruenewald 
et al. (2013). We first conducted a series of bivariate tests such as 
chi-square analyses and, where appropriate, Fisher’s exact tests. 
The significant differences between these sub-sets are explained 
below. A series of odds-ratios were then calculated. 
First, we examined the differences between those who learned 
online and those who did not. We found:
1. Extreme right-wing offenders were 3.39 times more likely to 
learn online than al-Qaeda inspired individuals. A regression 
analysis indicates that this disparity was largely accounted for 
through the use of extremist websites and the downloading of 
extremist images. There was no significant difference in terms of 
their propensity to utilise videos, lectures, extremist texts or other 
media. A second regression analysis indicated that the sole dif-
ference in terms of the instrumentality of the learning was in 
attack preparation. Extreme right-wing offenders were 4.19 times 
more likely to utilise online learning for attack preparation. There 
was no significant difference in terms of opting for violence, 
target choice, or overcoming hurdles. 
2. Those who plotted to attack a government target (as opposed 
to the civilian population) were 4.50 times more likely to learn 
online. Indeed 83% of those who plotted to attack a government 
target displayed traits of online learning. This significant finding 
holds when offenders convicted of facilitative activities were 
omitted. Of all those who actually plotted an attack, those who 
targeted the government were 3.58 times more likely to have 
learned online.
3. Of those who plotted an actual attack, those who targeted the 
military were significantly less likely to have learned online. 
4. Those who used/plotted to use an Improvised Explosive Device 
(IED) were 3.34 times more likely to have learned online. Those 
WHAT ARE THE ROLES OF THE INTERNET IN TERRORISM?32
who utilised an IED in an actual attack were 4.57 times more likely 
to have learned online. This is a reflection of the relative ease of 
availability of bomb-making manuals and YouTube videos that 
provide helpful demonstrations.
5. Those who used more primitive attack types like arson or 
unarmed assaults were significantly less likely to have learned 
online. Similarly, those who plotted an attack at a non- 
government location were significantly less likely to have 
learned online. 
6. Those who were members of a cell were significantly less likely 
to have learned online than lone actors. This may be a reflection 
that within a cell there is likely to be a pooling of human, social, 
technical and financial capital, the absence of which leads 
individuals to go online to learn how to conduct attacks. The 
corresponding finding that lone actors who tried to recruit others 
(and failed) were five times more likely to have learned online also 
lends credence to this interpretation.
7. The evidence suggests that online learning was also significantly 
more likely to be accompanied by face-to-face interactions with 
non-violent co-ideologues. Those who learned online were 
4.39 times more likely to have experienced non-virtual network 
activity and 3.17 times more likely to have experienced non-virtual 
place interaction. Of those who plotted an attack, the individuals 
who attended training camps were also significantly more likely 
to have learned online. This finding confirms the earlier research 
of von Behr et al. (2013) and Gill and Corner (2015).
Second, we examined the differences between those who communi-
cated online and those that did not. We found:
1. Extreme right-wing offenders were 2.41 times more likely to have 
communicated online with co-ideologues than al-Qaeda inspired 
individuals. This may be a function of the differing circumstances 
these ideological movements experience in the UK The UK’s 
extreme-right movement tending to be located online (Thornton, 
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2015) and extreme right-wing terrorist activity 
more likely to be conducted by lone actors in the 
UK (Gill, 2015). A regression analysis indicated that 
this disparity was largely accounted for by extreme-
right wing offenders’ greater propensity to use 
extremist online forums. There was no difference in 
terms of email or chat room usage. The latter forms 
of communication were more likely to be used for 
communication with (a) non-violent radicals and 
(b) non-radicals. There was no difference in terms of extreme-
right wing actors’ propensity to communicate online with other 
cell members or other terrorists. A final predictor of this disparity 
was extreme-right offenders’ greater likelihood of having used 
the Internet to disseminate propaganda compared to al-Qaeda 
inspired individuals. There was no significant difference in terms 
of reinforcing prior beliefs, seeking legitimisation for future 
actions, disseminating propaganda, providing material support to 
others, or attack signalling. 
2. Those who targeted the military were significantly less likely 
to have communicated online. Only 7.4% of those who plotted 
against the military communicated online with co-ideologues. 
3. Those who targeted property were twice as likely to communicate 
online than those who did not.
4. Those who plotted to use an IED were 1.78 times more likely 
to have communicated online. 
5. The evidence also suggests that communicating with 
co-ideologues online was significantly more likely to have 
been accompanied by face-to-face interactions with non-violent 
co-ideologues. Those who communicated online were 3.89 times 
more likely to have experienced non-virtual network activity 
and 3.17 times more likely to have experienced non-virtual place 
interaction. Of those who plotted an attack, the individuals who 
attended training camps were also significantly more likely to 
have communicated online. This finding confirms the earlier 
research of von Behr et al. (2013) and Gill and Corner (2015). 
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collectively the basic descriptive results, illustrative case studies, 
multi-dimensional scaling techniques, and inferential statistical 
methods provide much insight and instruction for the study of 
radicalisation as a whole and not just online radicalisation. The 
results also largely confirm the results found in von Behr et al. 
(2013) and Gill and Corner (2015). The Internet has not led to a rise 
in terrorism. It is largely a facilitative tool; radicalisation is enabled 
by the Internet rather than being dependent upon it. These three 
studies have now covered these questions with a number of different 
methodological approaches and samples and have arrived at largely 
the same conclusions.
The results provide further confirmation of the need for disaggre-
gated approaches to understanding terrorists. Traditionally, academic 
studies have focused upon aggregate understandings of terrorists or 
the ‘radicalised’. However this aggregate understanding hides the 
complexities that may differ across ideologies, across roles and across 
networked structures. Treating all terrorists in such a manner differs 
from criminological approaches that tend to split the outcome variable 
(Monahan, 2012) across crime types, or offender types (e.g. violent 
versus non-violent). This study illustrated the value to be gained from 
such distinctions and we regularly uncovered behavioural differences 
online in terms of target type, ideological motivations and attack types. 
The study also draws attention to the alleged dichotomy of online 
versus offline radicalisation. There is no easy offline versus online 
radicalisation dichotomy to be drawn. It is a false dichotomy. 
Plotters regularly engage in activities in both domains. Often 
their behaviours are compartmentalised across these two 
domains. For example, plotters may engage in face-to-face 
interaction regarding the ideological legitimacy of their actions 
whilst engaging in virtual communication regarding the techni-
cal specificity of bomb-making. Threat management procedures 
would do well to understand the individuals’ breadth of interac-
tions rather than relying upon a dichotomous understanding of 
offline versus online, which represent two extremes of a spectrum 
that regularly provide prototypical examples in reality. 
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As previously mentioned, emerging research argues that rather 
than analysing the ‘terrorist’ on an aggregate level, it might be more 
instructive to disaggregate our conception of the ‘terrorist’ into 
discrete groups (e.g. foreign fighters versus homegrown fighters, 
bomb-makers versus bomb-planters, group-actors versus lone actors) 
(LaFree, 2013). Our results suggest that any of those disaggregated 
approaches should not dichotomise whether radicalisation occurred 
online or offline. The reality is that in the vast majority of cases 
it is both. The multi-dimensional scaling also shows that online 
behaviours can take a multiplicity of forms. We found significant 
differences across targeting strategies, ideologies and network forms 
and actors’ propensity to engage in online learning and communica-
tion. However, the question remains whether these differences were 
caused by the needs inherent in such activities or whether access 
to particular online materials sparked these changes in behaviour. 
In other words, we are left with a chicken and egg situation: did the 
decision to target military forces necessitate the need to go online 
and develop capacity or did access to materials promoting the need 
to target military forces direct potential offenders toward that end? 
The types of analyses conducted in this study are unable to 
answer these questions with great confidence, however, because 
the granularity of the data does not allow for sequential analyses 
to be undertaken. Only through engaging with hard drives of con-
victed terrorists can such research be undertaken. In saying that, 
the narrative that the needs of a plot drive online search behaviour 
seems to make more intuitive sense given the findings herein. 
Selection of some harder targets led to online learning. Technically 
more difficult attacks like IEDs led to more online searching compared 
to primitive attack types. Lone-actors needed to learn more online 
because they lacked the pooling of human talent typically found in 
an attack cell. Extreme-right wing offenders were more likely than 
violent Jihadists in the UK to learn and communicate online, which 
may be due to the structural unavailability of co-offenders in their 
vicinity and being more likely to be lone-actors. Finally, as illustrated 
throughout, rare were the cases of everything being conducted online. 
Face-to-face interactions were still key to the process for the vast 
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majority of actors even if they were aware of, and made use of, 
the bounty of ideological and training material available online. 
Radicalisation should therefore be framed as cyber-enabled rather 
than cyber-dependent whilst also underlining that enabling factors 
differ from case to case depending upon need (e.g. who to attack, 
what tactic to use) and circumstance (e.g. availability of co-offenders, 
expertise, ideology). 
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